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INTRODUCTION
With the average daily value of $156,178,082,1 exporting goods
through international trade represents one of Louisiana’s most important
economic engines. The industry is responsible for one in five jobs in the
state and generates over $2 billion in annual state tax revenue, much of
which is dependent on maritime cargo vessels.2 However, vast uncertainty
remains over Louisiana’s maritime industry due to the implications of new
regulations from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) aimed at
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.3 In 2020, marine fuels will be
required to contain 85% less sulfur dioxide.4 This forthcoming regulation
resulted from decades of work to address greenhouse gas emissions from
the international shipping community. This new fuel standard will require
vessels to either begin using higher cost fuels or to retrofit their vessels
with expensive equipment5 in order to comply with the new standards.
Copyright 2019, by DANIEL W. BOSCH, JR.
1. This figure is reached by dividing the total value of 2017 exports from
Louisiana by 365. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE EXPORTS FROM LOUISIANA,
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/state/data/la.html [https://perma.cc/
UMY3-Z7SW].
2. LA. ASS’N OF BUS. & INDUS., LA. CMTY. & TECH. COLL. SYS., AN
INVISIBLE GIANT: THE MARITIME INDUSTRY IN LOUISIANA (2015), https://labi
.org/assets/images/media/Maritime_Workforce_Study_LABI_LCTCS.pdf [https://
perma.cc/EM2A-QPUJ].
3. Loren C. Scott, The Louisiana Economic Outlook: 2019 and 2020, ECONS.
& POLICY RESEARCH GRP., E.J. OURSO COLL. OF BUS., LA. ST. UNIV. 3 (2018),
https://www.oneacadiana.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/LEO_2019-20.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/6PXJ-VGFQ].
4. Sulphur 2020 - Cutting Sulphur Oxide Emissions, INT’L MAR. ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/pages/sulphur-2020.aspx [https://
perma.cc/R954-PYEK] (last visited July 23, 2019).
5. Scrubbers, such as those used to clean the emissions of coal burning
power plants, may be installed on ships to ensure compliance with the emissions
standards.

337577-LSU_EL_8-1.indd 266

1/3/20 7:23 AM

2019]

COMMENT

263

While this regulation impacts both the shipping and crude oil industries,
another IMO action could have even greater effects to the long-term
viability of the shipping industry. In April 2018, the IMO adopted an initial
strategy pursuant to an ambitious goal: reduce total greenhouse gas
emissions from international vessels by 50% by the year 2050.6 This
regulation goes beyond the IMO 2020 plan for sulfur content and has
vastly larger implications for the shipping industry. Moreover, while such
a reduction would have vast implications for international maritime law, a
comprehensive plan realizing this goal does not yet exist.
The IMO is unable to enforce new regulations unilaterally,7 relying
instead on its member states to enforce the regulation domestically. This
is the case for other IMO treaties and regulations, such as the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, or MARPOL.8
Under MARPOL, concurrent jurisdictions are established that allow for
inspection and enforcement of not only a nation’s own flag vessels, or
those which are registered with the respective state’s governing authority
for maritime regulations and enforcement,9 but also over vessels under
other flags that visit a nation’s territorial waters.10 The Obama
Administration stated its willingness to enforce these new fuel regulations,
but mixed reaction from the current administration casts misconceptions

6. Adoption of the Initial IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions
from Ships and Existing IMO Activity Related to Reducing GHG Emissions in the
Shipping Sector, Note by the International Maritime Organization to the
UNFCCC Talanoa Dialogue (Apr. 13, 2018), 1.
7. Implementation of IMO Instruments, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo
.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Implementation/Pages/ImplementationOfIMOInstrument
s.aspx [https://perma.cc/RW2A-FMKY] (last visited July 27, 2019).
8. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov.
2, 1973, 1973 U.S.T. 322, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184 [hereinafter MARPOL].
9. A nation’s flag vessels are those which fly its flag both within its waters
and on the high seas. The flag of a vessel is determined by where the vessel is
registered and submits documentation. As discussed later, exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction varies on the location of the vessel, and vessel owners are conscious
of the advantageous quality of certain nation’s laws for maritime purposes. See
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 91–94, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 3.
10. Marine Environment Protection Committee Res. 117/52, Amendments to
the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, (Oct. 15, 2004) (entered into force Jan. 1, 2007),
http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/Marine-Envi
ronment-Protection-Committee-%28MEPC%29/Documents/MEPC.117%2852%2
9.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E4W-8XWU].
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about whether the new fuel standard will be adopted domestically and in
what form.
Regardless of President Trump’s position on the new IMO strategy for
GHG reduction or any other international treaty on climate change,11 the
United States will have to comply with new IMO GHG regulations. The
international regulation of maritime activities poses a unique situation in
the context of international law. Maritime regulations adopted by the IMO
have a unique character in international law because member states have
less flexibility in choosing whether to adopt IMO regulations.12 This
unique character is due to the interconnected nature of maritime activity
and the need for uniformity for the protections offered by flag states.13
Consequently, it is to the advantage of the member state to provide for
consistent enforcement of IMO regulations to ensure that its effects, both
positive and negative, are experienced equally by all participating parties.
This is best achieved through clearly articulated standards adopted
domestically in the United States. Failing to adopt the IMO 2020 sulfur
standards would create confusion and panic for industry players, as
evidenced by adverse reaction of crude oil investors to the Trump
Administration’s unclear position on IMO 2020.14
As was the case with the IMO 2020 regulation, it is likely that the
IMO’s strategy for GHG emission reductions will also be considered as an
amendment to MARPOL, clearing the way to U.S. compliance and
implementation.15 Even without formal adoption by the United States, the
shipping industry will make its own choices as to whether it is “worth it”
to continue to operate internationally. That decision will likely be made
based on a variety of factors, such as the age of a company’s shipping fleet,
the existing capability of the fleet to reduce GHG emissions through

11. The U.S. Delegation to the IMO cited the Trump Administration’s
decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement in its objections to the IMO
strategy for GHG emission reduction.
12. Stephen Cunningham, U.S. Seeks to Phase in Shipping Rules, Sending
Refiners Sharply Lower, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2018, 2:10 AM), https://www
.bloombergquint.com/business/u-s-refiners-slump-as-trump-looks-to-slow-rollshipping-rules#gs.f9xQNuA [https://perma.cc/5R45-BZP7].
13. “It is the duty of the flag nation to control its vessels. If another nation
should wish to board a foreign flag vessel, the other nation would generally seek
authorization to do so from the nation whose flag the vessel flies. A foreign flag
vessel is thereby protected by her country of registration.” U.S. v. Rubies, 612 F.2d
397, 403 (9th Cir. 1979); See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979).
14. Cunningham, supra note 12.
15. See 33 U.S.C. 1901–1909 (2012).
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scrubbing technologies and alternative fuels, and the impact of
international trade to the company’s shipping portfolio.
This Comment will first provide an overview of IMO actions on
emission reduction to date, including MARPOL. Second, this Comment will
address adoption by the United States of the new GHG reduction strategy
pursuant to the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS) as it was utilized
to accomplish U.S. adoption of the IMO 2020 sulfur standards. Third, this
Comment will identify legal and normative challenges to the adoption of
emission reducing regulations for ships and will proffer solutions for these
challenges. Finally, this Comment will conclude that the growing
international consensus in favor of a 50% reduction in emissions will be the
ultimate factor in adoption by the United States.
I. BACKGROUND
The International Maritime Organization was created to bring
uniformity and consistency to maritime regulations on the high seas. Like
other international organizations, the organization has undergone changes
in policy goals since its founding, namely those related to climate change.
While the shipping industry was not at the forethought of other
organizations in framing climate change agendas, the IMO has endeavored
to find ways to incorporate and develop initiatives related to emission
reduction in its agenda. Specifically, the organization has used the
Convention to Prevent Pollution from Ships (or MARPOL) as a vehicle
for such emissions. First used to prevent careless discharge of oil and
pollutants into waters, it now extends to pollutants released into the
atmosphere through the adoption and subsequent amendment to Annex VI
of the Convention.
A. “I’m the Captain Now:” The Introduction of the International
Maritime Organization
The IMO is the global standard-setting authority for the safety,
security, and environmental performance of international shipping.16 It
was created by the United Nations in 1948.17 Its main role is to create a
regulatory framework for the shipping industry that is fair and effective,

16. Michael L. Hoffman, Ship Organization Nears Final Form; U.N.
Maritime Body Expected to Have 3 Principle Organs – Panama in Opposition,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1948, at 51.
17. Id.
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universally adopted, and universally implemented.18 It characterizes its
mission as creating “a level playing-field so that ship operators cannot
address their financial issues by simply cutting corners and compromising
on safety, security and environmental performance. This approach also
encourages innovation and efficiency.”19 While the IMO does not hold
enforcement authority, it still serves a “vital function coordinating the
uniformity of ship regulations and inducing cooperation among nations
with regard to the economic and technical aspects of maritime
commerce.”20
B. Changing Tides: The Framework for International Response to
Climate Change
The first major international agreement on climate change came in
1992 with the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (FCCC), thus setting forth the initial framework for
climate change solutions. The United States Senate ratified and adopted
the FCCC into domestic law shortly thereafter.21 However, the FCCC
imposed no legally binding obligations, targets, or timetables for limiting
GHG emissions,22 and the Clinton Administration would not agree to
amendments or protocols to the treaty that created a binding emissions
reduction commitment without subsequent Senate approval.23 At the 1995
Conference of the Parties to the FCCC in Berlin, the United States first
indicated it was willing to accept legally binding targets for capping GHG
emissions.24
The Third Conference of the Parties in 1997 produced the Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations FCCC.25 This Protocol called for a blanket
baseline 6% reduction in emissions among Annex I, or developed,

18. INT’L. MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/V6TQ-9SX9] (last visited July 27, 2019).
19. Id.
20. THOMAS SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 18-1 (5th ed.
2017).
21. International Convention on the Prevention of Climate Change, May 9,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
22. ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE
AND ENFORCEMENT, 422 (2001).
23. Id.
24. Organization Summary, Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide (ELAW), 8 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 127, 158 (1997).
25. REITZE, JR., supra note 22.
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nations,26 but imposed no obligation other than to report emissions for nonAnnex I, or developing, nations.27 While the United States agreed to a 7%
reduction to be implemented through domestic law, the treaty was never
ratified by the U.S. Senate primarily due to economic concerns.28
In 2016, the nations of the world convened in Paris to set forth a bold,
new agenda for combating climate change through the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions in an effort to decrease the temperature of the
planet by 2°C.29 The agreement identified specific ways nations would
reduce carbon footprints. This agreement, however, failed to include any
reference to the international shipping industry.
The interconnected nature of the industry makes it impossible to
attribute pollution to any one state. This is for two reasons. First, the only
way to attribute pollution to a state for international cargo vessels is
attribution to the vessel’s flag state, or the flag under which the vessel sails.
Second, even if that method is used, it is not foolproof, since many states
allow for their flag to be flown as a “flag of convenience.”30 For example,
Liberia and Panama are the two flags which vessels use most often, though
few of those vessels are owned by companies or individuals in either of
those states.31
The policy position of the United States on international climate
change policy and regulations fluctuates according to the ideology of the
President, the majority party in the houses of Congress, and economic
considerations at the time agreements are considered. For instance, the
economic conditions in the United States at the time of the adoption of the
Kyoto Protocol would have been more onerous for the United States than
for Europe, as the declining economy throughout eastern Europe allowed
26. Kate M. Joyce, U.S. Energy Policy Since September 2001, 15 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 31, 40 (2004).
27. Non-Annex I nations must report GHG inventories annually, but are not
required to make GHG reductions, while Annex II nations are a subset of Annex
I nations and must financially assist non-Annex I nations to meet GHG reduction
goals. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 40
ENVTL. L. 1261, 1264 (2010) (quoting Caleb W. Christopher, Success by a
Thousand Cuts: The Use of Environmental Impact Assessment in Addressing
Climate Change, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 549, 561 (2008)).
28. Id. at 1266.
29. INT’L. MAR. ORG., supra note 18.
30. “The term ‘flag of convenience’ refers to a state which registers foreignowned vessels, granting the vessel its nationality and the right to fly its flag, giving
the vessel the benefit of registration fees, annual fees, and taxes which are
considerably less than in other states.” ARND BERNAERT, BERNAERTS’ GUIDE TO
THE 1982 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 104 (2006).
31. Id.
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for baseline compliance to be met more easily.32 The United States’
population grew far more rapidly than many of the Annex I (or developed)
nations.33 Because no effective penalties are included in the Protocol for a
nation’s noncompliance, nations are relatively free to ignore the
agreement.34 Sweeping political changes within the United States in the
last decade have also contributed to this sort of variance in United States
climate change policy.35 While the United States initially joined the Paris
Agreement under the Obama Administration, President Trump has now
announced his intention to withdraw from the Agreement.36
C. Clearing the Slush:37 The Regulation of Maritime Pollution
The international shipping industry makes up 2% of GHG emissions
worldwide.38 In the absence of regulations, the IMO estimates that, at a
minimum, shipping emissions will increase 50% by 2050, but that increase
could be as high as 250%.39 This variation is due to modeling that takes
into account different levels of economic growth, as well as the impact of
32. Robert O. Mendelsohn, An Economist's View of the Kyoto Climate Treaty,
NAT'L PUB. RADIO ONLINE, (Feb. 18, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org
/templates/story/story/php.?storyId=4504298 [https://perma.cc/RB7R-CJND].
33. See Population (1990) by Country, NATIONALMASTER, http://www.nation
master.com/graph/peo_pop-people-population&date=1990 [https://perma.cc/BSH
2-7RZG] (last visited July 27, 2019). See also U.S. & World Population Clock, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/www/popclockus.html [https:
//perma.cc/X7BP-AE3U] (last visited July 29, 2019).
34. Reitze, Jr., supra note 27, at 1264–65.
35. See generally Amy Royden, U.S. Climate Change Policy Under
President Clinton: A Look Back, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 415, 455, 458
(2002).
36. The earliest that the United States can withdraw from the Agreement is
November of 2020 on the day after the 2020 U.S. Presidential election. UNITED
N ATIONS F RAMEWORK C ONVENTION ON C LIMATE C HANGE , https://unfccc
.int/news/on-the-possibility-to-withdraw-from-the-paris-agreement-a-short-over
view [https://perma.cc/JUN9-A6W6] (last visited July 27, 2019).
37. Aside from its more popular usage, “slush” was a term used in the Royal
Navy to refer to a greasy substance obtained by boiling or scraping the fat from
empty salted meat storage barrels. Cooks sold or exchanged it (usually for
alcohol) with other members of the crew, who would use it to grease parts of the
rigging of the ship.
38. David Shukman, Plea for Action on Shipping Emissions, BBC (Apr. 9,
2018) [https://perma.cc/576B-RQ4M].
39. INT’L MAR. ORG., THIRD GREENHOUSE GAS STUDY 2014: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 20 (2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-43701
631 [https://perma.cc/NWU6-TKTM] (last visited July 27, 2019).
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greater efficiency and control measures.40 For example, the level of
utilization of certain fuels, such as liquid natural gas (LNG), will affect not
only the overall level of pollution, but will also result in variation in
specific outputs of compounds, such as sulfur.41
The IMO’s initial strategy is largely a realization of the specific
provisions in the Kyoto Protocol’s mandate for international shipping and
the overarching goals of the Paris Agreement. Unlike the Kyoto Protocol,
the Paris Agreement does not include cargo vessels in its objectives42
because carbon dioxide emissions from shipping cannot be attributed to
any specific nation.43
1. Changing Ensigns: MARPOL’s Evolution of Pollution Regulations
MARPOL, or the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, was signed on November 2, 1973,44 and was later
modified by the Protocol of 1978.45 It is the main international convention
to prevent marine environment pollution from ocean-going vessels.46 This
multilateral maritime treaty aims “to achieve the complete elimination of
intentional pollution of the marine environment by oil and other harmful
substances and the minimization of accidental discharge of such
substances.”47 MARPOL is not a self-executing treaty or one which
becomes judicially enforceable through ratification.48 Instead, each signing
40. Id.
41. Id. at 22.
42. Aldo Chircop, Meinhard Doelle & Ryan Gauvin, Shipping and Climate
Change: International Law And Policy Considerations, CTR. FOR INT’L
GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (CIGI) (Sept. 6, 2018) (citing CANADIAN MARITIME
LAW 19 (Aldo Chircop et. al., eds., 2d. ed. (2016)), https://www.cigionline
.org/sites/default/files/documents/Shipping%27s%20contribution%20to%20clim
ate%20change%202018web_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7AV-TGHM].
43. Jessica Green, Why do we Need New Rules on Shipping Emissions? Well,
90 Percent of Global Trade Depends on Ships, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/17/why-dowe-need-new-rules-on-shipping-emissions-well-90-of-global-trade-depends-onships/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ff637f1a4ab1 [https://perma.cc/5F4H-D8KU].
44. U.S. v. Pena, 684 F.3d 1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing 1340 U.N.T.S.
62).
45. Protocol of 1978, Feb. 17, 1978, 1978 U.S.T. 322, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61.
46. MARPOL, supra note 8.
47. Id.
48. A treaty is only self-executing and thus has “automatic domestic effect” if:
(1) Congress has enacted implementing legislation; or (2) the treaty explicitly states
that it is self-executing. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 & n.2, 128 (2008).
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state agrees to “give effect”49 to it by establishing rules for ships that fly
its flag, certifying that such ships comply with the treaty rules, and
sanctioning those ships that violate the treaty.50 The Act to Prevent
Pollution from Ships (APPS), codifies MARPOL in the United States and
authorizes the U.S. Coast Guard to issue regulations implementing the
requirements of the treaty.51
Under MARPOL, it is the responsibility of the “flag state” to certify
that ships sailing under its authority (or “flag”) comply with MARPOL.52
With respect to the prevention of oil pollution, the flag state conducts an
inspection, or “survey,” and certifies the ship’s compliance by issuing an
International Oil Pollution Prevention (“IOPP”) Certificate.53 The flag
state may delegate the authority to conduct the survey and to issue the
IOPP Certificate to a recognized “classification society,” which is an
organization that inspects the vessels and issues the certificates on the flag
state’s behalf.54 The individual employed by a classification society to
conduct the survey and issue the certificate on behalf of the flag state is
known as a “surveyor.”55 “Port States”—nations visited by commercial
ships—may inspect the vessels entering their waters and ports to ensure
compliance with MARPOL regulations.56 An inspection of a foreign
vessel by a Port State is called a “port state control examination.” In the
United States, the U.S. Coast Guard is charged with conducting port state
control examinations to ensure that all commercial vessels entering the
United States comply with MARPOL.57

49. Id.
50. MARPOL, supra note 8, arts. 1(1), 4(1), 5(1); see also United States v.
Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 2009).
51. See 33 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(1); 33 C.F.R. § 151.01–159.321.
52. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Regs. 6.3.1, 6.3.4., Resolution MEPC.117(52),
Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, (Oct. 15, 2004)
(entered into force Jan. 1, 2007), http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/Index
ofIMOResolutions/Marine-Environment-Protection-Committee-%28MEPC%29/
Documents/MEPC.117%2852%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QK6-Q98A].
53. Id. at Regs. 6.1, 6.3.1, 7.
54. Id. at Reg. 6.3.1.
55. Id.
56. MARPOL, supra note 8, arts. 5(2), 6(2).
57. Oil Pollution, Inspection for Enforcement and Compliance, 33 C.F.R. §
151.23 (Mar. 1, 1991).
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2. Is it Applicable under Annex VI? Maybe SOx, Maybe NOx58
Annex VI of MARPOL sets limits for nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur
oxides (SOx), and particulate matter (PM)59 emissions from ocean-going
vessels that are of “400 gross tonnages or more, and general enforcement
and monitoring procedures.”60 Ratifying states are required to designate
certain sea areas as emission control areas (ECAs), where states enforce
the mandatory measures of Regulation 2 of Annex VI to control the
emission of “NOx or SOx and [PM] or all three.”61 This also includes
limiting the sulfur content of fuel oil to reduce SOx and PM emissions
through Regulation 14, and prescribing three “tiers” of design standards
for marine diesel engines to control NOx emission through Regulation 13.
Due to the long service life of cargo vessels,62 varying tiers of emission
standards are used under MARPOL Regulation 13 for marine diesel
engines depending on the age of the vessel: (1) 2000 to 2011, (2) after
2011, and (3) after 2016. These emission limits use rated engine speed
(rpm, revolutions per minute) as the variable in the formula model rather
than a finite standard of emission limits.63
3. Welcome Aboard: U.S. Adoption of Annex VI
The United States ratified Annex VI in 2008 and implemented the
mandatory air emission standards through amendments to the APPS and
the Clean Air Act.64 Currently, two ECAs have been established, covering
58. SOx and NOx are the periodic symbols for sulfur oxides and nitrogen
oxides, respectively. As there are several variants of these oxides, the “x”
subscript encapsulates all in a collective expression.
59. Particulate matter is the sum of all solid and liquid particles suspended in
air many of which are hazardous. This complex mixture includes both organic and
inorganic particles, such as dust, pollen, soot, smoke, and liquid droplets. ENVT’L.
PROT. AGENCY, PARTICULATE MATTER POLLUTION, https://www.epa.gov/pmpollution [https://perma.cc/JZQ8-L9QL] (last visited July 27, 2019).
60. Xiaoxin Shi, Making Ends Meet: Using a Market-Based Approach to
Incentivize Foreign Vessels to Comply with the Air Emission Standards of
MARPOL Annex VI, 4 PENN ST. J.L. & INT'L AFF. 556 (2015).
61. Id. at 560, 561 (citing MARPOL Annex VI, Regulation 2, ¶ 8).
62. The average life of a U.S. inspected cargo vessel in 2017 was 28 years.
U. S. COAST GUARD, DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., FLAG STATE CONTROL IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 5, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/
9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/CG-CVC/CVC1/AnnualRpt/2017Domestic
AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK9T-9XBQ].
63. MARPOL, supra note 8, at Annex VI, Regulation 13.
64. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (2012).
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virtually all U.S. coastlines. The North American ECA came into force on
August 1, 2012, extending up to 200 nautical miles from the Pacific coast,
the Atlantic coast, the Gulf coast, and the eight Hawaiian Islands. The
United States Caribbean Sea ECA, covering coastal waters around Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, was approved by the IMO in 2011 and
became enforceable starting January 1, 2014. Emissions of SOx, NOx, and
PM are all regulated in both ECAs.
D. Sulfur So Good, or Knot Good at All? IMO 2020 for Sulfur Content
Reduction
First envisioned twenty years ago, the IMO developed a final rule on
the sulfur content of marine fuels through an amendment to MARPOL
Annex VI.65 Specifically, the new IMO regulation looks to reduce the
sulfur content of the fuel used by international vessels from 3.5% per
weight to 0.5% per weight.66 This means the demand for heavy crude oil
variants will drastically decrease for cargo vessels, while the demand for
light, or “sweet” crude oil will drastically increase. The displacement of
heavy crude from the market may have far reaching effects on the global
energy market, but the increased demand for light, sweet crude will likely
have a positive impact for producers in the United States. IMO 2020 is
likely to result in increased global demand for sweet crudes (sulfur content
less than 0.3%), particularly from less complex refineries overseas that are
not well configured to remove sulfur from crude.67
E. Full Steam Ahead: the IMO Strategy to Reduce Greenhouse Gases
In April 2018, the IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee
(MEPC) adopted a bold new strategy to reduce all greenhouse gas
emissions generated by international vessels by 50% by the year 2050.68
65. INT’L. MAR. ORG., MARINE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION COMMITTEE
MEETING SUMMARY, 73RD SESSION (Oct. 22–26, 2018), http://www.imo.org/en/
MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MEPC/Pages/MEPC-73rd-session.aspx?platform
=hootsuite [https://perma.cc/3XQE-3GR3].
66. Id.
67. Stacy Morris, With the U.S. Exporting 20% Of Its Oil Production, What
Midstream Companies Could Benefit?, SEEKING ALPHA, (Sept. 12, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4205684-u-s-exporting-20-percent-oil-production
-midstream-companies-benefit?page=3 [https://perma.cc/WPC2-QFCY].
68. Adoption of the Initial IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from
Ships and Existing IMO Activity Related to Reducing GHG Emissions in the
Shipping Sector, Note by the International Maritime Organization to the UNFCCC
Talanoa Dialogue 1 (Apr. 13, 2018), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource
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At the 73rd session of MEPC, the body adopted the goals proffered by the
initial strategy through the year 2023.69 Those objectives include:
(1) the establishment of an Existing Fleet Improvement Programme,
(2) development and update of national action plans to develop
policies and strategies to address emissions in accordance with
IMO guidelines,
(3) the development of incentives to develop and take up new
technologies, the development of robust lifecycle Greenhouse Gas
(GHG) carbon intensity guidelines for all types of fuel, and
(4) the analysis of measures to encourage port developments and
activities globally to facilitate reduction of GHG emissions from
shipping.70
II. ROUGH SEAS AHEAD: THE TIDE OF ISSUES CONFRONTING U.S.
IMPLEMENTATION
The regulations of the IMO for both the forthcoming sulfur content
reduction standards and for the less specifically targeted Greenhouse Gas
Reduction strategy will present legal, economic, and policy issues. United
States statutory enactments giving effect to MARPOL could pave the way
for automatic compliance pending the Administration’s approval.
However, the two policies will be in conflict with one another as the
maritime industry seeks alternatives to achieve compliance.
A. Legal Questions of Implementation and Enforcement
From a legal perspective, it is unclear how the IMO’s new strategy
will affect the interpretation of MARPOL Annex VI. The Initial Strategy
and the Vision adopted by the IMO contain language strongly linking the
mission of the new strategy to the Annex; however, there is no direct
statement that this action is an amendment to Annex VI.71 Should the new
strategy be considered such an amendment, courts have held that the
President and Secretary of State hold expansive power in what may be

/250_IMO%20submission_Talanoa%20Dialogue_April%202018.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/7HAQ-C2H6] [hereinafter Talanoa Dialogue].
69. MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COMMITTEE 73RD SESSION, INT’L.
MAR. ORG. (Oct. 26, 2018) http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSum
maries/MEPC/Pages/MEPC-73rd-session.aspx [https:// perma.cc/C96W-GEZ5].
70. Id.
71. See generally Talanoa Dialogue, supra note 68.
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accepted.72 In Alaska v. Kerry, the U.S. District Court of Alaska concluded
that the enacting statute for Annex VI contains considerable flexibility in
the adoption of amendments to the Annex.73 Should the Executive Branch
choose to accept the amendment, it can do so without Senate consent and
may also promulgate rules and procedures through the Administrative
Procedures Act for the enforcement of those amendments.74
There are also legal issues that arise from the inherent nature of
maritime law and regulation. The diversity, functionality, and mobility of
shipping vessels inherently present challenges in how to enforce uniform
emission standards.75 The diversity of actors involved in the operational
life of a ship poses challenges in distributing emissions reductions
equitably.76 A ship’s energy use and efficiency starts with its construction.
Standards are often decided based on what will be required to achieve
cargo-carrying capacity, optimal fuel use and emissions outcomes.
Therefore, construction of new vessels will need to be guided by
international rules and standards including prospective standards with
effectiveness at a later date, as well as market demand and finance.77 The
payment arrangement customary to the industry for the construction of
such vessels must also be considered, as lengthy amortization periods and
balloon payment plans will have to be considered in any regulations made
pursuant to this new strategy.78 Additionally, the wide variety of classes of
ships will make uniform regulation nearly impossible to attain. Therefore,
the differences between classes will have to be factored into any new
regulations.79 Certain types and sizes of vessels require a minimum speed
to ensure maneuverability.
B. Why so Special? The Unique Character of the IMO in International
Law
Unlike other organizations and agreements, the United States would
find it substantially more difficult not to comply in a regulation that
governs the movement of ships and is enforced through concurrent
jurisdictions. The success of sulfur reduction regulations depends greatly

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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on equal and effective enforcement measures across member states.80
While on the high seas, a vessel is only subject to the laws and regulations
of the flag state which it claims.81 However, once a vessel enters the
jurisdiction of another nation via use of its territorial waters or ports, it
becomes subject to its regulations and laws.82 Consequently, travel
between nations by sea necessitates a heightened level of compliance and
sensitivity to the laws of other nations. Given that both IMO 2020 and the
new strategy for GHG emission reductions has garnered widespread
support, it is likely that U.S. ships will be subject to the requirements of
IMO requirements regardless of whether they are adopted in the United
States.
C. “Knot on My Watch!” Impacts to Industries and Their Response to
the IMO
There is the concern that the United States will carry the bulk of the
burden in the implementation of the IMO GHG-reduction strategy. As the
second largest exporter of goods, the United States will be the among the
most burdened nations, along with China and Germany.83 Given the
relaxed enforcement mechanisms contained in Kyoto and other similar
international emissions agreements, this debate will become a question of
whether enough nations actually implement these standards to justify U.S.
compliance.
Similar to the issues presented by IMO 2020, there have been
numerous concerns raised about the affordability of implementing this
proposal for ship-owners and oil producers.84 While environmental
activists and diplomats hailed the proposal as a major victory for
greenhouse gas reduction, the implementation of the proposal will have
considerably more drastic effects than IMO 2020, to which carriers have
80. Ralph Grimmer, Expected Pricing and Economic Impacts of the IMO 2020
Rule, STILLWATER ASSOCIATES (July 11, 2018), [https://perma.cc/44CL-ZV4W].
81. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 91, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 3.
82. Id. arts. 27–28.
83. Trade Profile – United States of America, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&C
ountry=US [https://perma.cc/3YVF-8ZHL] (last visited July 27, 2019).
84. Niels Bjørn Mortensen, IMO Greenhouse Gas Agreement – What Will be
the Impact on Shipowners and Operators? RIVIERA MARITIME MEDIA (Jul. 2,
2018), https://www.lngworldshipping.com/news/view,imo-greenhouse-gas-agree
ment-what-will-be-the-impact-on-shipowners-and-operators_53341.htm [https://
perma.cc/J2H9-CMQQ].
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consistently raised concerns that low-sulfur fuels will not be affordable to
use.85 Indeed, forecasts now project a significant price increase beginning
in the fourth quarter of 2019.86
The Trump Administration cited the need for technological innovations
for the implementation of the Initial Strategy.87 However, independent
researchers have found that emissions can be reduced by more than 75% by
2050 based on current technologies.88 In 2017, the Marine Environment
Protection Committee (MPEC) was advised that nearly 2,500 new vessels
had been certified as complying with energy standards of the Energy
Efficiency Design Index.89 One obstacle to U.S. compliance is the
requirements of Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act that shipments made
between U.S. ports be done using only ships built in the United States.90
This limits the number of shipbuilders available for U.S. shipments and the
supply of technology required to meet the goals of the Initial Strategy.
1. A Rough Riverboat Ride: Potential Impacts to Louisiana by IMO
2020 and GHG Strategies
At the mouth of the Mississippi River, Louisiana ranked first in the
nation in export intensity and export growth in 2015.91 The state transfers
500 million tons of cargo each year, accounting for 20% of the nation’s
total waterborne commerce.92 Attached to those transfers are over $2
85. Joseph Bonney, Report Downplays Cost Of Low-Sulfur Fuel, J. COMM.
36 (2017).
86. Erwin Seba, New Martine Fuel Rules to Boost Diesel Prices for at Least
a Year -Analysists, REUTERS (June 10, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/10
/reuters-america-new-marine-fuel-rules-to-boost-diesel-prices-for-at-least-a-year
-analysts.html [https://perma.cc/WKH2-LMY8].
87. David Shuckman, Global Shipping in 'Historic' Climate Deal, BBC (Apr.
13, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-43759923 [https://
perma.cc/3HRB-2W7U].
88. Evert A. Bouman, Elizabeth Lindstad, Agathe I. Rialland & Anders H.
Strømman, State-of-the-Art Technologies, Measures, and Potential for Reducing
GHG Emissions From Shipping – A Review, 52 TRANSP. RESEARCH PART D 408
(2017) (the authors are faculty and staff of the Industrial Ecology Programme and
Department of Energy and Process Engineering, Norwegian University of Science
and Technology).
89. Marine Environment Protection Committee Opens, INTERMARITIME
CERTIFICATION SERV. (July 4, 2017), https://icsclass.org/news/marine-environ
ment-protection-committee-opens-2/ [https://perma.cc/8A7B-23P8].
90. 46 U.S.C. § 50101 (2012).
91. LA. ASS’N OF BUS. & INDUS., supra note 2.
92. Id.
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billion in tax revenues and nearly one in every five jobs in the state.93 With
the maritime industry serving as such a vital role in Louisiana’s economy,
it is understandable that the forthcoming IMO regulations are causing a
great deal of uncertainty among the state’s leading economic experts.94
Conversely, another of Louisiana’s top industries, oil and gas, is set to
benefit from the IMO’s proposed changes for sulfur content, as fuels such
as natural gas and light, sweet crude will be in higher demand.95
What is not clear for either industry, however, is how either will be
impacted by the IMO strategy for overall greenhouse gas emission
reduction. The uncertainty surrounding the method of implementation and
the effects across domestic markets in each nation is concerning for the
future of the maritime industry.
III. SOLUTIONS: CHARTING COURSE FOR COMPLIANCE
While the IMO Strategy to reduce GHG emissions is concerning, the
nature and implications of the 50% reduction goal present a number of
opportunities for both sustainability within the industry and meaningful
emission reductions. Unlike IMO 2020, the GHG Strategy is framed to set
a goal for the entire industry rather than each individual vessel. The
Strategy incorporates a far less ambitious timeline, creating opportunities
for technological advancements in diesel engines and energy consumption
while allowing for a gradual and natural retirement of existing vessels
lacking the capacity to meet new emissions standards. However, a key
concern among hesitant nations is that new standards are enforced across
all nations and not simply those readily willing to comply.
A. Setting a Heading: Use of the MARPOL Annex VI Enforcement Model
In order to understand how a strategy as bold and broad as the 2050
reduction objective may be implemented, one must first understand how
similar standards are implemented and enforced by the United States. While
ships have the nationality of the State where they are registered,96 they also
traverse the waters of other nations when engaged in international trade.
This creates an issue for maritime law and enforcement, as well as a question
of what law applies and the consequences for noncompliance should U.S.
ships not meet the standards set by another state. Additionally, there is the
93.
94.
95.
96.
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question of grandfathering older ships and those that have changed
registration by virtue of a change in ownership.97
MARPOL is enforced through the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). The United States currently complies with MARPOL Annex IV.
Annex VI represents the portion of MARPOL that regulates air pollution
from ships.98 MARPOL was ratified and codified into U.S. law in 1980
through the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS) in Chapter 33 of
the United States Code.99 Together, the APPS and MARPOL Annex VI
establish the fuel sulfur standards applicable to ships operating in the
North American and U.S. Caribbean Sea Emissions Control Areas.100 The
EPA maintains authority to take action for violations of the APPS,
whenever such violations have been referred to the EPA by the U.S. Coast
Guard.101 Receipt of evidence of a violation constitutes a referral and
triggers EPA sanction authority.102 Under section 1908(b), the EPA may
assess a civil penalty of $25,000 per violation per day. The EPA must
calculate civil penalties by “taking into account the nature, circumstances,
extent, and gravity of the prohibited acts committed and, with respect to
the violator, the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability
to pay, and other matters as justice may require.”103
The APPS treats both foreign and U.S. flagged vessels alike. The
APPS provides that Annex VI applies to all foreign flagged vessels “in”
or bound for “a port, shipyard, offshore terminal, or the internal waters of
the United States.”104 Civil penalties are imposed for failure to provide
documentation of compliance with Annex VI. Each day of noncompliance is considered a separate violation.105 The EPA requires a
“corrective action plan signed by the ship owner or operator and a report
of the noncompliance to be sent to the ship’s country of registry.”106 A
97. Id.
98. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY: NORTH AMERICAN AND U.S. CARIBBEAN SEA
EMISSIONS CONTROL AREAS PENALTY POLICY FOR VIOLATIONS BY SHIPS OF THE
S ULFUR IN F UEL S TANDARD AND R ELATED P ROVISIONS 1 (2015), https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-03/documents/marinepenaltypolicy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M8BR-RPZ7] [hereinafter PENALTY POLICY].
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1901 (2012).
100. PENALTY POLICY, supra note 98.
101. Id.
102. 33 U.S.C. § 1907(b) (2012).
103. See 33 U.S.C. § 1908(b) (2012).
104. See 33 U.S.C.§ 1902(a) (2012).
105. See 33 U.S.C. § 1908(b) (2012).
106. OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL VESSEL COMPLIANCE (CG-CVC), U.S. COAST
GUARD, ECA JOB AID: DOMESTIC & FOREIGN VESSELS (2012), [https://perma
.cc/9NNS-YK68].
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class D felony is committed if a ship owner or operator “knowingly
violates” Annex VI.107 A class D felony generally carries penalties of
imprisonment for up to ten years.108 Up to one-half of the criminal fines
may be paid to the “person giving information leading to conviction.”109
The Coast Guard is responsible for conducting ship inspections and
investigations to establish criminal liability.110
The Coast Guard conducts compliance inspections on foreign vessels
when they call at a U.S. port as authorized by the control authority
provisions set forth in the establishment of emission control areas and
through federal statute.111 In doing so, the Coast Guard is allowed to board
the vessel, examine it for deficiencies, detain the vessel, or even expel it
from the port.112 Specifically for Annex VI, the Coast Guard examines the
vessel’s International Air Pollution Prevention Certificate, the oil record
book, technical files for the engines, bunker delivery notes, and engine
logs.113 The Coast Guard also inspects U.S. flag vessels that travel
internationally during annual inspections, which are typically analyzed
with heightened scrutiny.114 This jurisdiction holds regardless of whether
the vessel’s flag state has adopted the relevant international treaty or not.115

107. 33 C.F.R. § 151.04(c).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(A)(4) (2012); see also UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
& UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REVISED PROTOCOL
ON REFERRALS UNDER MARPOL ANNEX VI, AS IMPLEMENTED BY THE ACT TO
PREVENT POLLUTION FROM SHIPS 3 (2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/product
ion/files/2019-07/documents/annexvifonarrevreferralprotocolfinaljointexecuted.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7JDM-8XT3] [hereinafter U.S. COAST GUARD].
109. 33 U.S.C. §1908(a) (2012).
110. Id.; see also U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 108.
111. See 33 U.S.C. § 1902(a)(5)(A) (2012), which provides that Annex VI of
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships shall
apply to foreign-flagged ships that are in a port, shipyard, offshore terminal, or
the internal waters of the United States.
112. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, MARINE SAFETY MANUAL, VOLUME II,
COMDTINST 1600.78, § D, Port State Control, https://perma.cc/PW5J-GSQU
(last visited July 29, 2019).
113. Email Interview with Lieutenant Commander Andrew Czarniak, P.E.,
Inspections Division Chief, United States Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit –
Morgan City, Louisiana, (Dec. 28, 2018).
114. Id.
115. A vessel of a nonsignatory state may nonetheless be required to comply
with the provisions of an international treaty when a) the provisions have been
promulgated in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations and b) the vessel is operating
in U.S. waters and thus is subject to inspection and enforcement by the United
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B. “Belay That!” The Implications of Noncompliance in MARPOL Annex
VI Amendments
Just as the President and the Secretary of State may accept amendments,
they may also refuse to adopt the MARPOL Annex VI amendments.116 The
MARPOL enacting legislation provides that, following consultation with
the Secretary of the EPA, the Secretary of State may make a declaration that
the United States does not accept an amendment proposed pursuant to
Article VI of the MARPOL Protocol.117 The current administration is
reluctant to support the IMO strategy. Representing the United States at the
conference, Jeffrey Lantz118 spoke in opposition to the proposal, stating that
“achieving significant emissions reductions, in the international shipping
sector, would depend on technological innovation and further improvements
in energy efficiency.”119 Lantz also noted that the United States had
announced its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, another international
measure aimed at curving GHG emissions.120 As a sole executive
agreement, presidential action is the only requirement for execution of the
Paris Agreement.121 Executive agreements are politically, rather than
legally, binding because their effectuation is only guaranteed under the
administration with which the agreement is made.122 However, this
withdrawal is merely a statement of intent, as the Paris Agreement’s exit
provision does not allow for a nation’s withdrawal until November 4,
2020.123 This accounts for the three years of time since entry into force and
a one-year delay from receipt by the United Nations Secretary General of

States Coast Guard. See Cont’l Grain Co. v. Puerto Rico Mar. Shipping Auth.,
972 F.2d 426, 432–34 (1st Cir. 1992).
116. 33 U.S.C. §1909(c) (2012).
117. Id.
118. Jeffrey Lantz is Director, Commercial Regulations and Standards for the
Coast Guard’s Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security and
Stewardship. U.S. COAST GUARD, https://www.uscg.mil/Biographies/Display/
Article/1391277/mr-jeffrey-g-lantz/ [https://perma.cc/LE9J-ZU3J] (last visited
July 30, 2019).
119. Shuckman, supra note 87.
120. The Paris Agreement, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, art. 2, Dec. 12, 2015.
121. U.S. Dept. of State, Agreements Pursuant to the Constitutional Authority
of the President, 11 FAM 723.2-2(C) (2006), https://fam.state.gov/FAM/11FAM
/11FAM0720.html [https://perma.cc/Z2NN-R7P5].
122. See Executive Agreement, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
123. Paris Agreement, supra note 120.
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the nation’s notice of withdrawal as required by Article 28 of the
Agreement.124
These articulated concerns are not unlike those of the U.S. Senate in
response to the Kyoto Protocol,125 but highlight two key issues in the
enforcement of this strategy: (1) the technology required for enforcement
of the strategic goals may either be unavailable or impractical for some
cargo vessels to obtain and (2) the nature of a ship (i.e., not only as
movable property, but through its practical function) makes enforcement
of such a standard increasingly difficult. Annex VI affords ratifying states
with broad authority in enforcement. However, such authority is qualified
when the violation is caused by non-availability of low-sulfur fuels that
are in compliance with MARPOL standards.126 When this is the case,
Annex VI provides that when a ship furnishes evidence and documentation
of good faith attempts to secure compliant fuel without availability thereof,
the port state shall consider “not taking control measures.”127 Annex VI
prohibits the deviation or delay of a voyage in order to achieve
compliance.128
Just as executive action could be taken, shippers could theoretically
also make the choice not to comply. As it is candidly stated in the 20192020 Louisiana Economic Outlook, “after all, when you are in the middle
of the ocean, who is watching and what is the cost except reputational
damage?”129 The challenge for individual noncompliance is that the IMO
has threatened to put pressure on insurance companies to declare such
vessels “unseaworthy.”130 This means that those vessels would not be
eligible for insurance coverage on the high seas.131 It is unclear whether
unseaworthy declarations are a serious concern, as it would be a stretch
for actualization. However, the possibility does present a serious obstacle
about the viability of individual noncompliance.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
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C. It’s all in the Rigging: Technological Flexibility in Adopting the IMO
GHG Strategy
Annex VI includes flexibility in achieving compliance and encourages
technological innovation to do so.132 Under Regulation 4, port states can
allow “any fitting, material, appliance or apparatus . . . or other procedures,
alternative fuel oils, or compliance methods” so long as such alternatives
are as effective in terms of emission reductions as the measures provided
by Annex VI.133 In the event that low-sulfur fuel is unavailable or
unfeasible, installing desulfurization technology to achieve compliance is
permissible under Annex VI, but the high cost of these cleaning systems
makes this alternative unattractive.134
Similar to the response to IMO 2020, technologies exist that can
contribute to alleviating pollutant levels in emissions. Vessels that have
installed and operate stack gas scrubbing systems will be exempt from this
rule and allowed to continue utilizing 3.5% sulfur marine fuel.135 These
scrubbers are similar to those used at coal-burning power plants. Scrubbers
are expensive and not available in the quantities required for the 70,000
ocean-going ships to meet IMO 2020 requirements, with only enough for
roughly 3,000–4,000 ships by 2020.136 Ships can convert to LNG or
methanol to power their ships, but such a conversion would be expensive
as it requires new LNG bunkering infrastructures.
D. Treasure Chest Approach: Government Programs to Incentivize
Compliance
Just as is the case with other major regulatory changes, a policy
argument could be made that it is in the nation’s best interest to ensure
compliance through the utilization of assistance programs developed
domestically. Economic and technical assistance is one option for mitigating
losses for vessel owners and increased costs. This could be achieved through
either an increase in fuel premiums or acquiring new technologies in
“cleaning” with non-compliant fuels.
Because the IMO’s GHG strategy is framed to see an overall reduction
of the industry’s output rather than a vessel specific standard, it allows for
some flexibility and creativity in how the IMO’s goals can be reached.
132. Shi, supra note 60, at 566.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY
NOTICE 7 (2010)).
135. Morris, supra note 67.
136. Scott, supra note 3.
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This is a key difference between the GHG Strategy and IMO 2020, as the
sulfur content standard is vessel specific. Under the current posture of the
GHG Strategy, a system of carbon credits could be utilized, such as the
ones used in the European Union.137 Far from a new concept, carbon
credits and emissions trading programs would provide a solution to allow
older, less efficient vessels to continue to operate in the short term, while
incentivizing companies to modernize their fleets in the long term. Under
such a system, ship owners would either take measures to emit only what
they are allowed, reduce their emissions below the allowed amount and
sell or bank the surplus credits, or continue emitting above their allowance
and buy credits in a marketplace to cover it.138 Such programs have been
hailed as an effective method of emission reduction for a variety of
reasons. First, emissions trading has been successful in its major objective
of lowering the cost of meeting emission reduction goals. Second, the use
of emissions trading has enhanced—not compromised—the achievement
of environmental goals.139 The United States has emulated this model
through its Acid Rain Program.140
The Acid Rain Program (ARP) was established under Title IV of the
1990 Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments.141 The ARP requires significant
emission reductions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx)
from the power sector. The ARP established a permanent cap on the total
amount of SO2 emissions by electric generating units and was the first
national cap and trade program in the United States. The program has
achieved significant success.142

137. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, E.U. EMISSIONS TRADING SYS., https://ec.europa
.eu/clima/policies/ets_en [https://perma.cc/B4KQ-L952] (last visited July 27, 2019).
138. A. DENNY ELLERMAN, PAUL L. JOSKOW & DAVID HARRISON, PEW CTR.
ON GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE, EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE U.S.: EXPERIENCE,
LESSONS, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 8 (2003), https://
www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2003/05/emissions-trading-us-experience-less
ons-and-considerations-ghgs.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3FW-WZNT].
139. Id.
140. Lauraine G. Chestnut & David M. Mills, A Fresh Look at the Benefits
and Costs of the U.S. Acid Rain Program, 77 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 252 (2005).
141. Id.
142. Id.
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IV. ACROSS THE SEVEN SEAS: IMPLEMENTATION AS A MATTER OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
While maritime pollution reduction likely does not rise to the level of
a jus cogens143 of international law, the far-reaching effects of climate
change combined with the potential development of this regulation into
customary international law could be used to argue that the United States
has a duty to implement and comply with IMO pollution reduction
regulations. With the vast majority of IMO member states invested in this
regulation, it will be increasingly difficult for the U.S. to hold out under
the pressures of its fellow member states. Moreover, the nations of the
world have clearly stated the importance of climate change as a matter of
international concern through multiple agreements previously discussed in
this comment. The shipping industry is projected to contribute a
substantially higher amount of GHG emissions in the coming decades.
Under the Paris Agreement, the international shipping industry has a
general obligation to contribute to the goal of GHG reduction.
The Initial Strategy of the IMO has the potential to become customary
international law if multiple nations domestically adopt it. In order to
establish customary international law, two prongs must be met: a
demonstrated state practice, or usus, and a sense of legal obligation of the
state, or opinio juris.144 While the establishment of state practice is an
objective standard, establishing opinio juris requires a subjective analysis.
This is established through analysis of official communications and
writings of the state. Both usus and opinio juris can already be seen in the
reaction of more developed nations to the IMO Strategy on greenhouse
gas reduction; however, there are other industrial nations that have voiced
reservations or even opposition to the adoption of the Initial Strategy.145
Nations, such as the United States and China, have the potential to
become “persistent objectors” to the adoption of the IMO’s potential
regulations on greenhouse gases should they choose not to implement the
blanket requirement for a 50% reduction in emissions.146 Doing so could
undermine the potential for the development of customary international
law in this area. This would prevent the idea of implicit consent, or that
143. Jus Cogens are norms deemed to be so fundamental to the existence of a
just international legal order that states cannot derogate from them, even by
agreement. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 47 (4th ed. 2015).
144. Id.
145. Shuckman, supra note 87.
146. Holning Lau, Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in International
Human Rights Law, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 495 (2005).
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which occurs when a nation fails to voice objections or demonstrate its
non-conformity to an international norm. However, such efforts may still
prove futile, as the idea of the persistent objector has been criticized as
ineffective as a matter of general international law. There is no instance
where a dissenting state could claim such a status as a valid defense from
the application of an international customary rule.147
CONCLUSION
The general acceptance among the vast majority of the member states of
the International Maritime Organization GHG reduction strategy will make it
impractical for the United States not to comply.148 Doing so will not only be
impractical, it will also create an unfair advantage for foreign vessels who
only utilize U.S. ports while the U.S. shipping industry will be unfairly
prejudiced by compliance when entering foreign ports of nations that have
accepted and implemented the strategy. While the IMO strategy is expansive,
it is also likely that it could be considered an amendment to MARPOL, and
thus would be subject to the more expedited acceptance process outlined in
the APPS.149 There are several tools at the disposal of the Administration and
Coast Guard that have been recognized by courts to achieve compliance.
Additionally, technologies exist that would allow for compliance with the
strategy, though retrofitting vessels could prove to be a costly enterprise.150
Though there are ways that the United States could resist compliance, the
equitable treatment of vessels and the economic issues with an one-sided
system of enforcement will make it untenable to reject the GHG reduction
strategy.
Daniel W. Bosch, Jr.
147. Patrick Dumberry, Incoherent and Ineffective: The Concept of Persistent
Objector Revisited, 59 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 779, 780 (2010).
148. Shuckman, supra note 87.
149. 33 U.S.C. § 1909 (2012).
150. Scott, supra note 3.
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